Walaeus on Middle Knowledge, the Will, Freedom, Contingency, and Ethics

Gerald Milton Smith, Jr.

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Abstract

This paper reads Antonius Walaeus in his own words, from the *Opera omnia* printed at Leiden in 1643, on two questions. The first is whether there is in God a knowledge of how a free creature would act if it were set in a given circumstance, and whether that knowledge comes before God's decree or after it. He holds that there is such a hypothetical knowledge in God and that it precedes every decree, and he names Franciscus Gomarus as one who holds it. He denies that it is a third species of knowledge, for it belongs to the knowledge of simple intelligence. He denies that it is the cause of any decree, and he holds that the certainty of what happens rests on God's decree, with a hypothetical decree standing behind every hypothesis the knowledge contains. And he purges it of two abuses that he ascribes to certain Jesuits and those who follow them: the use that makes human merit the ground of election, and the use that takes away God's real action upon the will in conversion. The second question concerns the will's freedom under a decree that reaches every human action. He defines free choice as a faculty of reason and will by which man spontaneously chooses or refuses what the intellect has shown him. He holds that the decree does not take away liberty and contingency but takes them in, that God is not the author of sin, and that natural man has a liberty left for the good of this life.

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1. Middle Knowledge: Where He Stands with Gomarus and Where He Parts from the Jesuits

Walaeus took up one question about the knowledge of God in several places in his collected works. The question is whether there is in God a knowledge that stands between his knowledge of what is possible and his knowledge of what is future, a knowledge of what a free creature would do if it were set in a given circumstance, and whether that knowledge comes before God's decree or after it. The name for it is "middle knowledge." Walaeus uses that name, he calls the same thing hypothetical knowledge, and once he calls it a middle or conditioned foreknowledge. I use his terms as he uses them, and where I give the sense of a Latin sentence in English the words are mine.

My claim is that he did not simply choose between two sides. He holds that there is such a knowledge in God and that it precedes every decree, and he names Franciscus Gomarus as one who holds it. He denies that it is a third species of knowledge beside the two he has named. He denies that it is the cause of any decree. He denies that the certainty of what happens rests anywhere but in God's decree. And he strips from it two uses that he ascribes to certain Jesuits and to those who follow them: the use that makes human merit the ground of election, and the use that takes away God's real action upon the will in conversion. The position is a narrow one, and it is held with a good many conditions. Walaeus is neither simply a friend of middle knowledge nor simply its enemy, and the texts bear this out.

The evidence is of four kinds, and all of it stands in the *Opera omnia* printed at Leiden in 1643, four years after Walaeus died on 9 July 1639. The first is the locus on the knowledge of God in the *Loci communes*, where the question is asked, defined, answered, and cleared of what he judges to be abuses.[1] The second is a short return to the point in the locus on providence.[2] The third is a letter to Johannes Polyander in the *Consilia et epistolæ*, in which he sets out two ways of resolving a difficulty and gives an account of the second.[3] The fourth is his *Responsio* to Corvinus's *Censura* of the *Anatomy* of Pierre du Moulin, where he returns to the question at five places while answering an opponent in the second person.[4] I give no date for any of these passages and I do not order them by time. I take them in the order of the argument.

1.1 The Knowledge of Simple Intelligence and the Knowledge of Vision

The locus on the knowledge of God lays the ground before the question is put. In the right-hand column of page 174, Walaeus asks a question that he calls one of some weight: does God's knowledge precede his decree, or does it follow, in the order of eternity?[5] His answer divides the knowledge in two. The knowledge of simple intelligence, which is God's understanding of all that

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[1] Antonius Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De Dei scientia," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Franciscus Hackius, 1643), 173–76 (images 189–92). Image numbers are those of the Internet Archive scan walaeusoperaomnia01. The *Loci communes* occupy the first part of volume 1, and their printed page is the image number less sixteen; the locus is undated. Where I give the sense of a Latin sentence in English the rendering is mine. This is the convention declared in note 1 of Chapter 1. Scripture is quoted from the English Standard Version (ESV).

[2] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, 232 (image 248, left column).

[3] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Johannes Polyander, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 406 (image 990, right column). Vol. 2 begins at image 573; its printed page is the image number less 584.

[4] Walaeus, *Responsio ad Censuram Corvini in Molinaei Anatomen*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 101, 110, 114, 120, and 123 (images 685, 694, 698, 704, and 707).

can be, goes before the decree altogether, because it is natural to God. The figure he uses for how it stands to the will is a treasure. God chose by his will, out of the infinite treasure of his wisdom, the things that he willed to come about in time. The knowledge of vision, by which God sees things as certainly future, follows the act of the will, which is the decree.[6]

Two features of that answer matter for what follows. The first is that the order he is speaking of is an order of eternity and not of time. Nothing in the answer places the decree at one hour and the knowledge at another; the words are "precede" and "follow," and they say what is prior in the order of reasons. The second is that the knowledge of vision is tied to the word "certainly." It is knowledge of things as certainly future, and a thing is certainly future only when the will has fixed it. That is why the knowledge of vision follows the decree and cannot come before it. If there is a knowledge that comes before the decree, it cannot be a knowledge of things as certainly future in that sense. The question that comes next in the locus is whether there is such a knowledge, and what it would be.

Walaeus had announced the question a page earlier. At the end of an answer on page 173 he says that the "middle knowledge," which some there call in to their aid, will be treated at length later, and that how far it can be conceded or not will then be seen.[7] He does not promise a refutation. He promises to examine how far the knowledge can be conceded, which is a different undertaking.

1.2 The Question and Its Definition

Having given that answer, Walaeus lets what he has said stand outside controversy and turns to what he calls another question.[8] He puts it in these words:

> "Whether there is not some middle knowledge in God which precedes the decree?"[9]

The question is about order, as the answer to the previous question was. It does not ask whether God knows what a free creature would do. It asks whether there is a knowledge of that kind which stands before the decree. Walaeus then defines the thing asked about:

> "But that is called middle knowledge by which future things are known from a hypothesis, though they are not absolutely future … or are not yet"[10]

The definition runs on the word "hypothesis." A thing known from a hypothesis is known as what would follow if some condition were set, and it is called future only in that conditional sense. The

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[5] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De Dei scientia," 174 (image 190, right column): "Here a question of some weight is raised: whether the knowledge of God precedes the decree of God, or indeed follows [it], namely in the order of eternity?"

[6] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 174 (image 190, right column): "Simple understanding, or the knowledge of simple intelligence, altogether precedes, because it is natural to God"; "For God out of that infinite treasure of his wisdom chose by his will the things that he willed to come about in time. But the knowledge of vision, by which he beholds things as certainly future, in the order of eternity necessarily follows the act of the will, or the decree."

[7] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 173 (image 189, left column): "Concerning the middle knowledge, which some here call in to their aid, it will be treated later at length, and how far it can or cannot be conceded."

[8] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 174 (image 190, right column): "Let this therefore stand outside controversy. But here now [is] another question."

[9] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 174 (image 190, right column).

[10] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 174 (image 190, right column).

knowledge of vision sees what is absolutely future. The middle knowledge, on his definition, does not.

He gives the example at once, and it is the example of Adam. He asks whether God did not foreknow that Adam would abuse his liberty, if God made him such, adorned him with such gifts, and allowed him to be tempted, and this even before God decreed to create him and so to adorn him. He adds that the same may be asked of the other events of free choice that depend on the will of angels or of men.[11] The example sets the matter in its sharpest form. The act is a free act of a creature. It is supposed in a circumstance that God would make. And the question is whether the supposition is known before the decree that makes the circumstance.

At the foot of the column he records that the question divides the orthodox. He sees, he writes, that among orthodox writers there are some who do not admit the knowledge, because some infallibility seems to be set up in things apart from God's decree, in the things themselves, or in the infallible dependence of things upon one another.[12] The objection is a serious one, and Walaeus states it in full. A knowledge of what a free creature would do, which stood before the decree, would seem to fix an infallibility in the creature's act that the decree had not fixed. Everything in his answer turns on that objection.

1.3 The Position He Takes

Then comes the other side. There are, Walaeus says, some among the orthodox, and among them Franciscus Gomarus in his Theses on predestination, who think that the knowledge should be affirmed outright.[13] He gives their two reasons. They hold it because of certain places of Scripture that seem to assert it. And they hold it so that the immutability of all God's decrees can be kept, and so that it can be explained in some way how God, by his decree, is not the author or cause of evil.[14] The two reasons are different in kind. The first is exegetical and the second is theological, and the second has two parts, one about the decree's immutability and one about evil.

He then states his own position, and he states it in a sentence that has to be quoted entire:

> "from those places and others like them it is manifest that there is some such hypothetical knowledge in God before every decree of his, concerning what was certainly going to be."[15]

The sentence does three things. It takes its warrant from the places of Scripture that the page has been citing, and it does not rest on an argument from philosophy. It says "some such" knowledge,

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[11] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 174 (image 190, right column): "Whether God did not foreknow that Adam would abuse his liberty, if God made him such, adorned him with such gifts, allowed him to be tempted, etc., even before he decreed to create him and to adorn him with such gifts, etc.? and so of the other events of free choice, which depend on the will of angels or of men."

[12] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 174 (image 190, right column): "I see that among orthodox writers there are some who do not admit it, because some infallibility seems to be set up in"; and 175 (image 191, left column): "in things, apart from God's decree, in the things themselves, or in the infallible dependence of things upon one another."

[13] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, left column): "There are, however, some among the orthodox, and among others Franciscus Gomarus in the Theses on."

[14] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, left column): "who think that it should be affirmed outright; both because of certain places of Holy Scripture which seem to assert this; and so that the immutability of all God's decrees can be kept: and it can be explained in some way how God, by his decree, is not the author or cause."

[15] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, left column).

and the phrase is careful; he affirms that a knowledge of this kind exists and does not claim to have said everything about it. And it says "before every decree," which is the position that the objection just stated was aimed at. He does not draw back from the words of the question. The knowledge precedes the decree.

He knows that the position needs defending against the objection, and he defends it in three ways.

The first is a concession. He says: "we confess, however," that a conditional decree is also included in those conditional predictions, as will be seen later, but that this does not remove the thing itself.[16] The point is brief and easily passed over. A hypothetical knowledge does not stand alone for him; a conditional decree accompanies it. The knowledge is hypothetical, and the decree that goes with it is conditional, and he says that the second does not take away the first.

The concession is taken up again on the next page. On page 176 Walaeus reasons first that if some upright man believed, he would be saved. He then says that the whole difference lies in singular instances, which do not depend on rules of that kind already fixed by God, as he had said before, and that in these, as he had also warned before, a conditional decree of God must necessarily be understood.[17] The sentence is firmer than the concession. On page 175 a conditional decree is said to be included in the conditional predictions. Here it is said that it must be understood in the singular instances that no rule already fixed by God decides.

The second is the argument from the covenants, which he numbers as the fourth. Without this hypothetical knowledge, preceding the decrees of God, he says, the immutability of the divine decrees can hardly be defended.[18] God determined first to set life before man under the condition of obedience to the law, and after the fall under the condition of faith in Christ. One of two things must then be said. Either this hypothetical knowledge of the fall must be placed before the covenant of the law, to which God afterwards joined the other; or it would have to be said that God, when the first covenant was decreed and foreknown, changed his purpose only after the fall, and substituted another covenant.[19] The argument is about God's constancy. If God knew what man would do only after he had decreed the first covenant, then the second looks like a change of plan. If he knew it before, the second covenant was part of the plan from the first. Walaeus takes the first course, and he takes it because he will not have God change his purpose. The argument makes the hypothetical knowledge a guard on the immutability of the decrees and not a threat to it.

The third is the answer to the objection itself, which he sets down in the form of an objection and a reply.

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[16] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, left column): "We confess, however, that a conditional decree is also included in those conditional predictions, as will be seen later: but this does not remove the thing itself."

[17] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 176 (image 192, left column): "therefore, if some upright man believed, he would be saved."; "The whole difference therefore lies in singular instances, which do not depend on rules of that kind already fixed by God, as was said before, in which, however, as we have also warned before, a conditional decree of God must necessarily be understood."

[18] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "IV. Finally, without this hypothetical knowledge preceding the decrees of God, the immutability of the divine decrees seems hardly able to be defended."

[19] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "God first determined to set life before man under the condition of obedience to the law"; "[after] the fall, however, under the condition of faith in Christ. Therefore either this hypothetical knowledge of the fall must be placed before the covenant of the law, to which God afterwards [joined] the other"; "or it would have to be said that God, the first covenant having been decreed and"; "then only after the fall of man changed his purpose, and substituted another covenant."

1.4 The Objection and the Answer

The objection is that on this view an infallibility is set in contingent and possible causes, and that this infallibility is not from God's decree.[20] Walaeus answers by denying the claim, and the reason he gives is a reason about the hypothetical decree. A hypothetical decree must be supposed here as well. It cannot be said that this will be, this being posited, unless the thing that is posited is itself posited by the decree of God; for the supposed condition cannot posit itself, and still less can it be posited or come about rashly or by chance.[21]

Put in plain terms, the argument is this. The objector says that if God knows what a creature would do under a condition, then the condition-and-outcome has a firmness that did not come from God. Walaeus replies that the condition itself, the circumstance in which the creature is supposed to be set, is something that God's decree posits. A hypothesis is never free-standing. The *if* is supplied by the decree of God, and so what follows from the *if* is not outside that decree. The infallibility that he is charged with setting apart from the decree is not apart from it. This answer is the center of his position on the knowledge. The hypothetical knowledge is before every decree in the order of reasons, and at the same time every hypothesis it contains is a hypothesis that stands on a decree of God.

1.5 What He Purges

Having taken the position, Walaeus turns at once to its use. His reason is stated plainly: because certain Jesuits, and others following them, abuse this middle knowledge, the opinion "must be purged" of their errors.[22] He does not say that the knowledge is to be given up; he says that it is to be cleansed. He names two abuses.

The first is against those who by this opinion about middle knowledge pave the way to establishing human merits in election and in preservation. What they want, he says, is that God, before he elected a man, saw through how that man, if this or that preventing and concomitant grace were offered to him in this or that order of things or in this or that state, would by his free will assent or not assent. The sentence closes on the words "not the reverse."[23] Walaeus calls this false and contrary to Scripture, and he says that it will be shown later. The abuse he is naming is exact. It does not lie in the knowledge that God has of what a man would do. It lies in the order: God elects after seeing how the man's free choice would answer grace offered, and so the man's choice stands at the ground of the election. He cites Romans 9:16 at this point.[24]

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[20] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "But thus an infallibility seems to be set in contingent [and] possible causes, which is not from God's decree."

[21] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "This is denied, because a hypothetical decree must necessarily be supposed here as well: for it cannot be said, this will be … this is posited, unless that very thing is posited by the decree of God; for it cannot posit itself, much less be posited or come about rashly or by chance."

[22] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "Because, however, certain Jesuits, and others following them, abuse this middle knowledge, therefore this opinion must be purged of their errors."

[23] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "First against those who by this … about middle knowledge pave the way to establishing human merits in election and in preservation. For this is what they want, namely that God, before he elected a man, saw through how, if this or that … preventing and concomitant in this or that order of things, or in this or that state, were offered to the man, he would by free will assent to it or not"; "so that free will the grace of God to him … not the reverse."

[24] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "not the reverse. That this is false, and contrary to Scripture, [will be shown] later." The printed reference is Rom. 9, verse 16. Rom. 9:16 (ESV): "So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy."

The second abuse is against those who put forward this opinion about middle knowledge before the decree is fixed, so as to take away from his will all real action of God, which they call physical, in the conversion of a man.[25] Walaeus says that it will be shown later that God acts not only morally but also physically in the human will when he converts it. The word "physically" needs care. It is set here against "morally": a moral working persuades, and a physical working is a real working upon the will itself. It is not the modern sense of a material or bodily force, and Walaeus uses it to say that God does more than set reasons before the will. He gives as proof that God opens hearts to attend to what is preached to them, and he cites Philippians 2:13 beside it.[26] The page prints the reference "Act. 17. vers. 3" for the first of these.[27]

These two purges draw the line. The knowledge is to be kept, and the use that would make the creature's determination the ground of election is to be refused, as is the use that would reduce God's action in conversion to persuasion. What he is defending is God's grace in election and in conversion, and he is defending it with a knowledge that the Jesuits whom he corrects also use. His quarrel with them is a quarrel about what is built on the knowledge. He does not say that the knowledge itself is the fault.

1.6 One Species and Not Two

The page then turns to a question that the classification of knowledge raises. It is not necessary, he says, that this hypothetical knowledge be set up as some third species of knowledge, because it belongs to the knowledge of simple intelligence.[28] The reason is a reason from what God must know. It is absolutely necessary, he says, that God know from eternity all the possible modes of second causes, whether they act alone or with others, and so what would happen or not happen from each certain hypothesis posited, if he produced those causes, or acted with them this way or that way, or disposed them or allowed them to be disposed. No Christian, he says, will deny this.[29]

The classification is important, and it is the point at which Walaeus most clearly separates himself from those he corrects. The scheme he has laid down has two knowledges, the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision. A middle knowledge in the sense of a third species would stand between them. Walaeus does not allow it a place of its own. Whatever is true in it is true because God knows all possibilities, and so it is the knowledge of simple intelligence, which already precedes the decree. The knowledge that follows the decree is the knowledge of vision, and it follows because the decree has fixed what shall be. By placing the hypothetical knowledge under simple intelligence, Walaeus makes it a part of what God knows out of the treasure of his wisdom,

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[25] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "Next against those who put forward this opinion about middle knowledge before the decree is fixed, so as to take away from his will all real action of God, which they call physical, in the conversion of a man."

[26] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "For it will be shown later that God acts not only morally but also physically in the will of man when he converts him. For he himself opens hearts so that they attend to the things." Phil. 2:13 (ESV): "for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure."

[27] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "are preached to them, Act. 17. vers. 3. and."

[28] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "Finally, it is also not necessary that this hypothetical knowledge be set up as some third species of knowledge; because it belongs to the knowledge of simple intelligence."

[29] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, right column): "that God [know] all the possible modes of second causes, whether they act alone or with others, from eternity"; "what would infallibly happen from each certain hypothesis posited, or"; "would happen, if he produced those causes, [acted with] them this way or that way"; "or disposed them this way or that way or allowed them to be disposed: this no Christian will deny."

applied to every supposition of circumstance. That is why he can say that it precedes the decree and that it is not a cause of the decree, as the letter to Polyander says.

1.7 The Letter to Polyander

The letter that Walaeus wrote to Polyander, printed in the *Consilia et epistolæ*, takes up the question again in another form. The page is page 406 of the second volume. In the right-hand column he first names an opinion that he will not have. Because of these difficulties, he says, some who are not plainly of his side have recourse to a bare foreknowledge of God, as if God had foreseen to which side the human will would bend in all its actions, apart from any antecedent decree of his own, and had resolved only to govern the outcome of the matter outside man. That opinion, he says, is in his judgment absurd. His reason is that a thing future as future could not be foreseen by God unless it were already future, and that it could not come about unless God had decreed at least to permit it: otherwise, he says, something would have been brought into act by itself, with God either not caring or unwilling. And he adds that the opinion is not free of sacrilege, because it makes the will so much the lord of its own actions that it is ruled by none but itself. That, he says, is above the condition of a created will and proper to God alone, who looks upon and rules not only external events but also every inward motion, as Scripture shows in many places.[30] The argument is of a piece with the Loci. In the locus the knowledge of vision, which sees things as certainly future, follows the decree, and the hypothetical knowledge is of things that are not absolutely future. Here he says that a foreknowledge with no decree behind it cannot stand, because a thing does not come to act without at least a decree of permission.

He then sets out two ways. It seems altogether to him, he writes, that one must either profess our ignorance frankly with Chytraeus, or have recourse to the middle or conditioned foreknowledge.[31] The saying that comes to him through Chytraeus is that the man knows that all things are governed by God, and that he sees contingency and liberty in things, and that how the two are reconciled he does not know. The other way, Walaeus says, is the way of Gomarus: to have recourse to that middle or conditioned foreknowledge, which many scholastic writers posit, and recent writers as well, though Ames rejects it without cause, since there are many examples of it in Holy Scripture.[32] The first way is an honest confession of ignorance. What follows in the letter is the exposition of the second, and it is plain from the exposition that this is the way he takes.

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[30] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): “Because of these difficulties some, although not plainly ours, have recourse to a bare foreknowledge of God, as if God had foreseen to which side the human will would bend itself in all its actions, apart from any antecedent decree of his own, and had resolved only to govern the outcome of the matter outside man. But this opinion in my judgment is absurd and”; “because a thing future as future could not be foreseen by God unless it were already future: but future”; “it could not [be], unless God had decreed at least to permit that it should come about: for otherwise, with God either not caring or unwilling, some thing would have been brought into act by itself: not to mention that this opinion is not free of sacrilege, because it makes the will so much the lord of its own actions that it is ruled by none but itself”; “which is above the condition of a created will, and proper to God alone, who looks upon and rules not only external events but also every inward motion, as Scripture in many places.”

[31] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): “It seems therefore altogether to me here, either with … our ignorance must be frankly professed, who from … That all things are governed by God, I know:”.

[32] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): “recourse must be had to that middle or conditioned foreknowledge, which many”; “and recent writers posit, although”; “it is rejected, since there are many examples of it in Holy Scripture.”

The exposition is a fuller statement of the hypothetical knowledge than the Loci gives. As God knew, in the infinite light of his knowledge, the series of all things and causes that he could produce, and what could infallibly follow from what, so also before every decree he foreknew how the will of man would be inclined this way or that way, these or those things being posited, without violation of its liberty, provided that he himself brought those causes into act and did not hinder the external occasions.[33] The conditions are stated with care. The knowledge is of the will's inclination in a supposed order of things, the will's liberty is not violated, and the whole is stated on the footing that God himself brings the causes into act. Then he adds that as God foreknew before every decree that it could come about in various ways, so also by his free decree he chose this way rather than that.[34] He adds that it is plain from Scripture that among these ways there is one that Beza and Perkins have set down.[35]

The letter closes the passage with a caution. This infinite treasure of things known by the divine mind is not to be set up as the cause of any decree afterwards made by God. It is the treasure from which the divine will, directed through his wisdom, freely took some part.[36] The Loci used the same figure, the infinite treasure of God's wisdom from which his will chose what it willed to come about in time. The letter says it again as a caution. The treasure does not cause the decree. The will chooses, and chooses freely.

1.8 The Responsio

The *Responsio* is Walaeus's answer to Corvinus's *Censura* of du Moulin's *Anatomy*. It is a work of controversy, and Walaeus speaks in it to an opponent in the second person, and does not state his own doctrine in order. I take the five places in the order of the pages.

On page 101 he is speaking of the wisdom of God. God administers and governs all things not only powerfully but wisely, and God's wisdom is considered not only in the effecting of the work but in its eternal disposition, which is the wise disposition of the work to come. That disposition he places in the knowledge of simple intelligence, and he says that it goes before every certain act of the will. In the same sentence, in a parenthesis, he speaks of the knowledge that concerns us, in connection with simple intelligence: "to which that middle [knowledge], if any is to be called such." The phrase "if any is to be called such" is a careful one. It does not deny that the thing exists, and it does not accept the name without condition. The middle knowledge, whatever it is to be called, is spoken of in relation to simple intelligence, which precedes the will's certain act. I read the parenthesis as the placing that the Loci make, set down in a clause.[37]

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[33] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): "[in] himself knew in the infinite light of his knowledge the series of all things and causes which he himself could produce, and what could infallibly follow from what: so also before every decree"; "how the will of man would be inclined this way or that way, these or those things being posited, without violation of its liberty, provided that he himself brought those causes into act, the external occasions."

[34] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): "could come about in various ways before every decree, so also by his free decree [he chose] this way rather."

[35] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): "than that. Among which ways also"; "and by Perkins set down, is plain from Scripture."

[36] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): "Here, however, this also is to be observed, that this infinite treasure of things known by the divine mind is not to be set up as the cause of any decree afterwards [made] by God"; "from which the divine will, directed through his wisdom, freely [took] some part."

On page 110 he speaks of the writers whom he opposes, and here he names them. In a list of recent Jesuit writers he puts Fonseca, Suárez, Molina, and Lessius. The list is a polemical one: it tells the reader whom he has in view, and it does not discuss any of the four. They are the men who try, by middle knowledge and by what they call moral causations, to reconcile God's providence with free choice, and who nevertheless bring in some determining necessity upon the specific actions of free choice, a necessity that does not come from free choice but from God's providence. They therefore do not concede that every determining necessity conflicts with liberty, and Walaeus shows this against them.[38] The argument is a pointed one. Those who hold middle knowledge in order to protect the freedom of the will have not, on his account, protected it from a determining necessity; they have only moved the necessity to providence. The page goes on to describe their opinion as one that supposes that God, before every decree of his providence, foresaw how man's free choice would determine itself if it were placed by divine providence in this or that order of things and occasions.[39]

On page 114 he is speaking of permission. Permission by which a certain act is permitted to the will presupposes a certain determination of the will to this act rather than to that, if it is set in this order of things by divine providence and no obstacle is put in its way. It is a determination that comes from the will so left to itself and not from the one who permits. This hypothetical determination in evil acts, Walaeus says, is not excluded from the decree of permission, provided that it be added that the foresight of the determination from a hypothesis of the future is not the cause of the decree.[40] That is the doctrine of the letter, the one point that does the work in each place: the foreknowledge may be admitted, and it must not be made the cause of the decree.

On page 120 he is again answering the man he is writing against. What the opponent "calls in," Walaeus says, he does not simply deny, as he had warned before, provided that the opponent understand the knowledge of simple intelligence, to which, he says, we refer that hypothetical knowledge which precedes the decree.[41] He gives his reason: absolute knowledge cannot have a place in God except after the decree already made, as the opponent himself confessed in the previous chapter. And he adds that so great is the force of truth that at times it is drawn from the

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[37] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 101 (image 685, left column): "But the wisdom of God is considered not only in"; "but also in its eternal disposition, which wise disposition of the work to come [is] also in the knowledge of simple"; "(to which that middle [knowledge], if any is to be called such,"; "and going before every certain act of the will."

[38] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 110 (image 694, left column): "Molina"; "middle [knowledge] and moral causations, as they call them, try to reconcile the providence of God with free choice,"; "some determining necessity upon the specific actions of free choice"; "bring in, which is not from free choice, but from the providence of God; and therefore every determining necessity"; "to conflict with liberty they do not concede, which I show thus."

[39] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 110 (image 694, left column): "This opinion supposes that God, before every decree of providence"; "foresaw how the free choice of man [would] itself"; "determine, if it were placed by divine providence in this or that order of things and occasions."

[40] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 114 (image 698, left column): "we are treating of permission, by which a certain act is permitted to the will, which permission presupposes a certain determination of the will to this rather"; "than to that; if it is set in this order of things by divine providence, and no obstacle is put in its way, as was seen before, and indeed a determination which comes from the will so left to itself, and not from the one who permits, of which hypothetical determination in evil acts"; "we do not exclude from the decree of permission; provided that this be added, that this foresight of the determination from a hypothesis of the future is not the cause of the decree."

[41] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 120 (image 704, right column): "you call in, we, as we warned before, do not simply deny it, provided that the knowledge of simple"; "you understand, to which we refer that hypothetical [knowledge] which precedes the decree."

unwilling.[42] Walaeus has two steps here. The first is that the hypothetical knowledge goes before the decree, which is the Loci's classification. The second is that absolute knowledge comes after the decree, which I take to be the Loci's knowledge of vision. And he has taken the second step from the opponent himself.

On page 123 he speaks of the hypothetical decree, and he draws the line within the decree. A hypothetical decree of God, if orthodox men were to speak of it, could be admitted by him in a sound sense, because God has decreed to promise us his benefits and life under this or that condition. He freely admits, he writes, that some of God's decrees include a condition, the fulfillment of which is nevertheless God's as well, and he speaks of God's willing to bring it about that the condition is fulfilled. But in the sense in which the opponents press it, the matter stands otherwise, as du Moulin noted in his eighth paragraph, because they bring in conditional decrees of God whose outcome depends on an uncertain human choice, and whose event would therefore be uncertain to God himself, except after the human determination had been foreseen.[43]

This passage is the plainest statement of the difference in the whole of the evidence. He admits the hypothetical decree in a sound sense: God decrees to promise benefits and life under a condition. What he refuses is a conditional decree whose outcome hangs upon a human choice that is uncertain even to God until it has been foreseen. I read that refusal together with the purge of merit in the Loci; each denies that God's decree is made to wait upon the creature's choice. Between the sense he admits and the sense he refuses lies the whole of what Walaeus means by saying that the hypothetical knowledge precedes the decree and does not cause it.

1.9 Infallibility and the Order of Things

The locus on providence returns once more to the connection between middle knowledge and infallibility. On page 232 Walaeus says that from the hypothesis of divine foreknowledge alone, and indeed of that middle foreknowledge, some necessity of infallibility follows, as was seen before.[44] The order of things in which a will, once placed there, will certainly will or not will something is, he says, something beside the will of man, and it comes from God's singular government.[45] He draws from this a difficult question: how, when God has this special concurrence in all the actions of the human will, God is not the cause, or at least a helper, of sin. He answers that

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[42] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 120 (image 704, right column): "is: for absolute knowledge cannot have a place in God except after the decree already"; "as you yourself confessed in the previous chapter. Indeed, so great is the force of truth that at times [it is drawn] from the unwilling."

[43] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 123 (image 707, left column): "A hypothetical decree of God, if it were spoken of by orthodox men, could be admitted by us in a sound sense, because namely God has decreed under this or that condition to promise us benefits"; "and life: whence also we freely admit that some of God's decrees include a condition, the fulfillment of which is nevertheless God's as well"; "or he wills to bring it about that the condition be fulfilled by"; "But in the sense in which it is pressed by you"; "Cl. Molinæus noted in paragraph 8, because conditional [decrees] of God"; "you bring in, whose outcome depends on an uncertain human choice; and therefore whose event would be uncertain to God himself, except after the determination of the human choice has been foreseen." The "Cl. Molinæus" of the page is Pierre du Moulin, whose *Anatomy* the *Responsio* defends; the courtesy title Cl. is left as printed.

[44] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 232 (image 248, left column): "Nay indeed, from the hypothesis of divine foreknowledge alone, and indeed of that middle [foreknowledge], some necessity of infallibility follows, as was seen before."

[45] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 232 (image 248, left column): "For that order of things, in which a will, once placed, will certainly will or not will something, is something beside the will of man, and [is] from God's singular government."

two things are to be held as certain and beyond doubt. All evils are subject to God's singular providence, and God is nevertheless not the author of sin.[46]

The page connects the matter in two directions. The order in which a will is placed is tied to God's own government, and this is the answer given in the Loci to the objection about infallibility; the infallibility is not apart from God. And the second of the two certainties, that God is not the author of sin, is the same concern that Walaeus ascribes to Gomarus's side on page 175, where the knowledge is wanted so that it can be explained how God, by his decree, is not the author or cause of evil. A knowledge of what the creature would do before the decree could be turned to undo either of the two certainties. Cleansed as he cleanses it, it undoes neither.

1.10 The Names He Gives It

Walaeus does not hold to one name for the thing. In the *Loci communes* he asks about a "middle knowledge" and defines it, and a page later he speaks of "this middle knowledge" when he turns to the abuse of it, and of a "hypothetical knowledge" when he adopts it and when he refuses it a species of its own.[47] In the letter he writes of "that middle or conditioned foreknowledge," joining two adjectives with "or," which is how a writer gives two names for one thing. In the *Responsio* he speaks of "that middle [knowledge]" on one page and of "that hypothetical [knowledge]" on another. The names of the knowledge are therefore three, middle, hypothetical, and conditioned, and in the passages I have used they are not set against one another.

The names of the decree are of another kind. He speaks of a "hypothetical decree" in answering the objection about infallibility and again in the *Responsio*, and of a "conditional decree" in the concession that goes with his adoption of the knowledge. The two sets of names answer two questions. Where the question is what God knows before he wills, the name is one of the names of the knowledge. Where the question is what God has willed under a condition, the name is one of the names of the decree. The whole of his defense depends on keeping the two questions apart, and the man who runs them together makes the position contradict itself where it does not.

1.11 What He Holds

The evidence now permits a summary of the doctrine in the order of its parts.

Walaeus holds that there is in God a hypothetical knowledge of what a free creature would do in a supposed circumstance, and that this knowledge precedes every decree. He says so in the Loci in the sentence quoted above, and he says it in the letter and in the *Responsio*. He rests it on Scripture, and he judges that the immutability of God's decrees is better kept with it than without it.

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[46] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 232 (image 248, left column): "Now there follows also a difficult question, namely, how, while this special concurrence of God stands in all the actions of the human will, God is not the cause, or at least a helper, of sin? But that this may be rightly explained, these two things are to be held as certain and beyond doubt. 1. That all evils too are subject to the singular providence of God. 2. That God nevertheless is not the author of sin."

[47] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De Dei scientia," 174 (image 190, right column): "Whether there is not some middle knowledge in God which precedes the decree?"; 175 (image 191, right column): "abuse this middle knowledge"; "this hypothetical knowledge be set up as some third species of knowledge." Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, letter to Polyander, 406 (image 990, right column): "recourse must be had to that middle or conditioned foreknowledge, which many." Walaeus, *Responsio*, 101 (image 685, left column): "that middle [knowledge]"; 120 (image 704, right column): "that hypothetical [knowledge]"; 123 (image 707, left column): "hypothetical decree of God." Walaeus, *Loci communes*, 175 (image 191, left column): "conditional decree."

He holds that this knowledge is not a third species. It belongs to the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is natural to God and goes before the will. The knowledge that sees things as certainly future is the knowledge of vision, and that follows the decree.

He holds that this knowledge is not the cause of any decree. The letter says it of the treasure of things known. The *Responsio* says it of the foresight of the will's determination. A decree is a free act of God's will, directed by his wisdom, that takes a part from the treasure.

He holds that the certainty of what happens rests on the decree, and that a hypothetical decree stands behind every hypothesis the knowledge contains. The condition that is supposed is put there by God's providence, and so the infallibility of the outcome is not set in the creature apart from God.

And he holds that the knowledge may not be used to put merit in election or to take God's real action out of conversion. He names these as the abuses of certain Jesuits and of those who follow them, and he cleanses the opinion of both.

The positions are held together, and each one answers an objection that would arise from another. The classification under simple intelligence answers the charge that a third knowledge has been introduced. The denial that the knowledge causes the decree answers the charge that God waits upon the creature. The hypothetical decree answers the charge that infallibility is set apart from God. And the two purges answer the charge that the whole is the Jesuit doctrine under another name.

This chapter reads Walaeus only. It does not set his statement beside Gomarus's own, and it does not set him beside the Jesuit writers in their books. What it has done is to read what Walaeus says in his own words and in their own sense, and to show that the sense holds from one place to the next.

2. Will, Freedom, Contingency, and Ethics

The question of this chapter is how Walaeus speaks of the freedom of the human will when he also holds that God's decree and knowledge reach every human action. I ask four things: what he means by the words "liberty" and "free choice"; how he joins the decree to the freedom of man and the contingency of second causes; what he says of necessity; and what he allows to natural man in the matter of ethics. I take each term as he defines it on his own pages and read it in the sense he gives it. I do not bring to it the sense it carries in later debate, and I apply to him none of the labels of that debate.

The evidence stands in the *Opera omnia*. The first part is the *Compendium ethicae*, from which I take pages 274, 276, 277, and 278.[48] The second is the locus on free choice in the *Enchiridion*, on folio 16.[49] The third is the *Loci communes*, in the locus on providence at pages 231 and 232 and in the locus on regeneration at page 440.[50] The fourth is the *Responsio ad Censuram Corvini in Molinaei Anatomen*, page 95.[51] The fifth is a letter in the *Consilia et epistolæ*, page 405.[52] I do not order these passages by time. I do not date the letter, and I do not name the man to whom it is written. Where I give the sense of a Latin sentence in English the words are mine. Each quotation is a continuous stretch of his text.

2.1 Free Choice Defined

The *Enchiridion* treats free choice in a locus of its own. He writes that this is the "locus which is treated in the first part of the Catechism is the locus on free choice; concerning which we shall inquire into two things. I. What it is." The second question is in what matters it is concerned.[53]

"Free choice," he writes, "properly signifies the faculty of reason and will by which man spontaneously chooses or refuses what has been shown to him by the intellect," whether the thing shown be good or evil. He explains why he names two powers: "for free election these two principles necessarily concur." Reason is "the eye of the soul, which knows and weighs the things to be chosen or spurned, but the will [is] like a hand," and the hand takes hold of what reason has judged or turns from it.[54]

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[48] Antonius Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2 (Leiden: Franciscus Hackius, 1643), 274, 276–78 (images 858 and 860–62). Image numbers are those of the Internet Archive scan walaeusoperaomnia01. The printed page of the second volume is the image number less 584. Where I give the sense of a Latin sentence in English the rendering is mine. This is the convention declared in note 1 of Chapter 1. Scripture is quoted from the English Standard Version (ESV).

[49] Walaeus, *Enchiridion religionis reformatæ*, "De libero arbitrio," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Franciscus Hackius, 1643), fol. 16 (image 32). The *Enchiridion* and the *Loci communes* occupy the first part of volume 1, and the printed page of each is the image number less sixteen.

[50] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, 231–32 (images 247–48); "De regeneratione," 440 (image 456).

[51] Walaeus, *Responsio ad Censuram Corvini in Molinaei Anatomen*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 95 (image 679). The printed page of the second volume is the image number less 584.

[52] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, 405 (image 989). The lines I cite do not give the date of the letter or the name of the man addressed.

[53] Walaeus, *Enchiridion*, "De libero arbitrio," fol. 16 (image 32).

[54] Walaeus, *Enchiridion*, "De libero arbitrio," fol. 16 (image 32).

This liberty is twofold, of contradiction or of election. "The liberty of contradiction is called that faculty by which the same object [can] either be admitted or be refused." The liberty of election is the faculty "which out of various objects proposed can take up one, [and] neglect or reject the rest." He adds: "Each of these liberties is sufficiently conspicuous in human actions."[55]

Then he writes: "Thus far the theologians mostly agree with the writers on ethics, but the whole difficulty sticks here." The difficulty, he goes on, is whether man is so free in his actions that he is their absolute lord. The question "can be treated in a twofold respect, either in respect of divine providence, or in respect of quality," that is, of the quality of the objects. The first belongs to another locus: "question pertains to the locus on the providence of God; where it will be examined and solved."[56] The *Loci communes* have their own locus on providence, and I turn to it below; I do not say that these are the pages the *Enchiridion* has in view.

2.2 The Voluntary and the Four Uses of Liberty

The *Compendium ethicae* is the second place where he defines the words. On page 274 he speaks of the voluntary. He says that the spontaneous and the unwilling are "that which follows reason," and they are "actions that proceed from a man as man." He goes on: "Man therefore is said to act unwillingly in two ways, either through compulsion, or through ignorance."[57]

On page 276 he turns to liberty and begins with the word: "The word liberty is homonymous, and is wont to be used in various ways." He sets four uses in order. In the first, anything spontaneous is called free, and this liberty belongs to animals too; the ox, he says, seeks its fodder freely. In the second, free are those acts of will "which are directed by reason. So the angels in heaven [act] freely and yet always well," and he adds that the will of man freely wills his last end and his blessedness.[58]

In the third, he writes, "it is taken for that which is subject to no one, or depends on no one. In this way God alone [is] free," and God alone is "and absolute Lord of his actions." In the fourth use liberty is the power of taking or refusing a thing proposed, of following or fleeing it. "This last liberty is held to be twofold," he writes: the liberty of specification and the liberty of exercise. The liberty of specification is the power, as the schoolmen call it, "of choosing after prior deliberation," one thing from several proposed, and of passing over the others. "But [the liberty] of exercise is called the power of choosing one thing proposed or" of refusing it, and "by others it is called the liberty of contrariety." He then states which use is his subject: "And of this last kind of liberty we must properly treat."[59]

So the word "liberty" is not one thing in his pages. In the first use it covers the spontaneous, in the second the acts that reason directs, in the third God alone, and in the fourth the power of taking or refusing. The liberty of the fourth use is the one he treats.

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[55] Walaeus, *Enchiridion*, "De libero arbitrio," fol. 16 (image 32).
[56] Walaeus, *Enchiridion*, "De libero arbitrio," fol. 16 (image 32).
[57] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 274 (image 858).
[58] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 276 (image 860).
[59] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 276 (image 860).

2.3 The Seat of Liberty

On the same page he comes to the seat of this liberty. He does not stay on it: "We do not dispute here also at greater length in which faculty [is] the proper seat of this liberty," and he gives his reason, "since on either side arguments of no small [weight]."[60]

He nevertheless gives an opinion. It is "the received and more common opinion, and more fitting to the ways of speaking of Holy Scripture," that the seat is "in the will, in which this faculty has been implanted by God, that [it may turn] itself either way."[61] He adds that "the will in itself is blind," and so can choose or refuse nothing "without the indication and judgment of the intellect."[62] The indifference of the intellect, which reaches to different means, "is also a cause why the will can vary its acts."[63] This, he says, is what the schools mean when they say that liberty is in the intellect radically and in the will formally.[64]

2.4 The Decree and Freedom

On page 277 he sets the philosophers' opinions aside and gives what he calls the true and Christian view.[65] It is that all human actions, "both good and bad, both universal and singular, are subject to divine providence and government, and are ruled by the same, according to his eternal decree."[66] They are ruled according to God's knowledge as well. Two grounds are given: Scripture, "which clearly testifies to it in many places," and reason, for "reason also necessarily proves that very thing."[67]

His argument from reason runs by the opposite supposition: that things "which would not come about according to the decree of God, have existence outside God, he being either ignorant, or neglecting, or unwilling," and of this he writes, "none of which can be ascribed to God without blasphemy."[68] He concludes: "All things therefore come about with him knowing, willing, and ruling." This is by a will and rule "by which he does good things and promotes them, but evil things he justly permits."[69]

Three objections follow, and I give them as he gives them. The first is the question put to him: how is man free in his actions, "or how does he merit praise in good, and punishment in evil?" He answers that the difficulty is so great that some, "because they cannot reconcile these things with one another," deny God's government in single actions with the Peripatetics, and others, "or assert with the Stoics that all things happen by fate." He states the rule by which he proceeds: "But even if this difficulty could not be removed, what is plain in Scripture would not on that account have to be denied."[70]

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[60] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 276 (image 860).
[61] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 276 (image 860).
[62] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 276 (image 860).
[63] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 276 (image 860).
[64] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 276 (image 860).
[65] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[66] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[67] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[68] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[69] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[70] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).

He introduces his own answer: "It seems, however, that moderate minds can be satisfied in this way." It is that the decree concerning things that are contingent and depend on man's liberty is "to include liberty and contingency," not to shut them out. His reason is the wisdom of God: "because the wisdom of God is so great that by his decree he has not violated the nature of inferior causes." God reaches the thing he set before himself and also "the manner in which he willed it to happen." He decreed that necessary causes "should produce their actions necessarily, but contingent causes contingently, and from prior choice." So man acts freely what he acts, "because God decreed that [he should do] these actions rather than those freely."[71]

The second objection is that a decree that determines the will to produce these actions rather than those seems to remove the liberty of the will, "since this belongs to liberty, not to be determined by another, but by itself."[72] His answer is a distinction between liberty absolute and liberty of the creature:

> "I confess that this belongs to absolute liberty, not to be determined by another, but only by oneself. But this absolute liberty falls on God alone: it suffices, however, for the liberty of the creature, if it determine itself as the proximate cause of its actions"[73]

To this he adds, "that it be determined by God as the supreme cause," who leaves to the creature its own motions. He cites Augustine's *De civitate Dei* for the point.[74]

The third objection is this: "But these things can hardly be understood." His reply begins by agreeing: "Answer. I confess [it], and this gladly." For a finite intellect he grants "that the ways and modes of acting of an infinite power and wisdom cannot be perfectly grasped; nor yet does it follow from this that this thing is not so." He then argues from what all grant: "For all (unless they are worse than Turks and heathens) acknowledge," that God foresaw from eternity the determination of the human will in all its actions. Then he asks, "But who among men could understand how God [foresaw] a certain event" in causes not determined? And he sets a challenge: "let someone explain to me how God by the infinite light of his knowledge foresaw this without violation of human liberty, [and] I [will explain] to him" how God "by his [decree] decreed it from eternity, and executes it in time without violation of his liberty."[75] His reply sets the mode of foreknowledge and the mode of decree side by side, and he leaves the mode of each unexplained.

2.5 Necessity and Infallibility

The *Loci* take up the same difficulty under the head of necessity. On page 231, in the locus on providence, an objection is stated: "If all things are ruled by God even specially, then all things come about necessarily. But this conflicts with liberty." His answer grants a part: "We confess that in some respect they are necessary." The respect is divine providence, and the things are those "which come about from a free and contingent cause" when the proximate cause is considered. But this necessity "does not conflict with liberty."[76]

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[71] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[72] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[73] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[74] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[75] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 277 (image 861).
[76] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 231 (image 247).

He writes that "a distinction is to be made between absolute or simple necessity, and necessity," and the second is the hypothetical, "or in a certain respect; which by others is called the necessity of infallibility." He takes the distinction from the demonstrative syllogism, "as is known from logic": in every true syllogism "the middle term is always the cause of the consequence, but is not always the cause of the consequent, that is, of the attribute of the conclusion." The same thing can therefore be necessary in one respect and contingent in another.[77]

What he means by the necessity of infallibility he states in a sentence I give whole:

> "because, God's determination being posited, the event will indeed follow infallibly; but yet not immediately from that determination, but by the mediation of man's liberty; which God does not violate by his determination, but takes in and confirms."[78]

He also calls it the necessity of infallibility in respect of foreknowledge, which reaches the end and the means.[79]

On page 232 he says that from the hypothesis of divine foreknowledge alone some necessity of infallibility follows, as he has already shown. "For that order of things, in which the will, once placed, will certainly will or not will something," is something besides man's will, and is "from God's singular government."[80]

A harder question follows, and he states it plainly:

> "Now there follows also a difficult question, namely, how, while this special concurrence of God stands in all the actions of the human will, God is not the cause, or at least a helper, of sin?"[81]

"Concurrence" is his word for God's acting together with a creature in its action, and he speaks of it as special and as present in all the actions of the human will. For this question he gives two points to be held: "1. That all evils too are subject to the singular providence of God. 2. That God nevertheless is not the author of sin."[82] I cite no more of this passage than the two points, and I do not give his way of joining them.

2.6 The Manner of the Effect

The locus on regeneration takes up the matter in an objection. On page 440 it reads, "Thus free choice is overthrown," and the first part of his reply is brief: "Answer. 1. This is denied," just as free choice is not overthrown by creation in the image of God.[83] His second reply is from Scripture, where God turns the hearts of men and puts into their hearts what they do. He gives the instance of Saul, whom the Spirit impelled and changed into another man, and he writes of him "yet [the Spirit] did not on that account overthrow his choice."[84]

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[77] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 231 (image 247).
[78] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 231 (image 247).
[79] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 231 (image 247).
[80] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 232 (image 248).
[81] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 232 (image 248).
[82] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De providentia Dei," 232 (image 248).
[83] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De regeneratione," 440 (image 456).
[84] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De regeneratione," 440 (image 456).

He then speaks of the Spirit: "and works all things in all, as he himself wills, not as men will," and the verse he cites is 1 Corinthians 12:11.[85] He gives the cases: "who were called outside the ordinary way, neither in the angels, nor in Christ, has free choice been taken away, nor in those who have contracted a habit of evil."[86] The reason follows in a sentence I give whole:

> "for such is the wisdom and power of God that he effects not only the thing but also the manner of the thing, that is, certain effects with the manner of liberty: just as he so rules necessary things that he does not take away necessity; so also free things, that he does not take away liberty."[87]

The *Compendium* has the same thought on page 277, where God reaches the thing and also "the manner in which he willed it to happen."

2.7 Contingency in the Second Act

A letter in the *Consilia et epistolæ* states contingency at greater length than any other passage I cite. In it he takes up what he calls the third point that needs further explanation: "in what way God by his decree and by the government of things agreeing with it does not take away the [contingency] of causes," that is, of second causes. He agrees with the man to whom he writes on one point: "Most truly it is held by you, most distinguished Sir, that the providence of God does not change the natures of things, and therefore so rules contingent and voluntary causes that they act contingently and voluntarily."[88]

Then he adds a caution, and in it he sets the first act of second causes beside the second:

> "that the contingency of second causes not be considered only in the first act, or their undetermined power"[89]

It is to be considered also in the second act, in the production of "single effects." The reason: "For in order that true contingency be preserved," the principle must not only remain undetermined in itself, but also "this or that [action] must proceed from that principle contingently and freely." The conclusion follows: "that that free principle be determined not only by a higher principle but also by itself." He says that Augustine indicates as much when he says that God "so administers all the things which he has created that they too exercise their own" motions.[90]

The question follows: "how these things can stand with the divine decree, so that the decree of God without violation of such contingency always and infallibly" obtains its effect. He writes: "I see various ways [put forward] by various [men]," and "by which they try to explain this, when it is a question of the actions of the will."[91] He reports one: "Some [hold] that wills are so gently inclined by God," by an inner and hidden working and by occasions set before the will from outside, so that

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[85] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De regeneratione," 440 (image 456). 1 Cor. 12:11 (ESV): "All these are empowered by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as he wills."
[86] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De regeneratione," 440 (image 456).
[87] Walaeus, *Loci communes*, "De regeneratione," 440 (image 456).
[88] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[89] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[90] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[91] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).

the will of its own accord wills what God has decreed.[92] I do not cite what he says of these ways, and I report no judgment of them.

"The example of the lame horse, which is wont to be brought in here," he writes, does not seem to him, with deference to better judgment, to fit the matter.[93] His reason is this: "because the concurrence of God with vicious actions" is "far other than [that] of one driving a horse with a lame horse," and "for the lameness of the horse plainly follows that motion of necessity, and therefore the horse merits no punishment by its lameness."[94] The word "concurrence" here is the one he used in the *Loci*, and the horse is his example of a concurrence in which the effect follows by necessity. The will of man moved by God, he says, does not fail of necessity:

> "but fails contingently and freely: whence it also comes about that it binds itself to a particular guilt in each particular vicious action before God."[95]

Then he states a distinction concerning man: "the natural man in acting can do nothing but sin," yet the regenerate man is often able not to sin when he sins.[96] The impotence of the natural man is not only Adam's but is in each man, "who proves and increases that impotence in himself, and by proving and increasing [it] also makes [it] peculiarly his own."[97]

2.8 Certainty of Salvation

On page 95 of the *Responsio* he takes up what he calls a fourth use of the doctrine, which he says du Moulin commends.[98] The use, as he gives it, is that "the assurance of salvation, unless on the unchangeable decree of God, and not" on the choice of man, would totter.[99] He says that nothing is truer than this axiom, and he gives his reason:

> "is truer: for just as the actions of human choice are in themselves uncertain and changeable, so also the salvation that depended on it would of necessity be altogether uncertain and changeable. Therefore also Holy Scripture, when it wishes to make believers certain of future salvation,"[100]

The sentence goes on: "to console through it, never from human choice, but from God's decree of election concerning them." It ends: "and from its constancy draws that certainty."[101] Here he uses "choice" of the human will as the source of acts that are in themselves changeable.

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[92] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[93] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[94] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[95] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[96] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[97] Walaeus, *Consilia et epistolæ*, 405 (image 989).
[98] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 95 (image 679). The Molinaeus of the page is Pierre du Moulin, whose *Anatomy* the *Responsio* defends.
[99] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 95 (image 679).
[100] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 95 (image 679).
[101] Walaeus, *Responsio*, 95 (image 679).

2.9 Ethics and Natural Man

On page 278 of the *Compendium* he speaks of a good by which "[this] life and human society are preserved."[102] As to attaining that good, he writes:

> "that some liberty and faculty still remain to natural man, as the arguments brought by Aristotle and the examples of many praised heathens"[103]

The arguments and examples show it, he says, and Scripture itself testifies to it in the Pharisees. He sets a limit at once: "Meanwhile, however, this also is to be held here." He names "Plato, Pythagoras, Plutarch," with others, as men who "are forced to acknowledge" that nature is "very weak" for attaining this good by itself.[104] So he allows a liberty left to natural man and calls nature weak for this good. I cite no more of the sentence than this.

2.10 What He Holds

On the pages I cite, Walaeus holds that free choice is a faculty of reason and will by which man spontaneously chooses or refuses what the intellect has shown him. He holds that the word "liberty" has four uses, that absolute liberty belongs to God alone, and that the liberty he treats is the power of taking or refusing a thing proposed. He gives the seat of that liberty to the will, as the received opinion and the one more fitting to the ways of Scripture, while he leaves the dispute about the seat open; the will is blind in itself and chooses nothing without the intellect's judgment.

He holds that all human actions, good and bad, are ruled by God's eternal decree and knowledge, and that the decree does not take away liberty and contingency but takes them in. God effects not only the thing but the manner of the thing, and so necessary causes act necessarily and contingent causes contingently. The creature is the proximate cause of its actions and is determined by God as the supreme cause. He grants that the difficulty is great and that a finite intellect cannot grasp the whole of it, and he does not therefore deny what Scripture makes plain.

He distinguishes two kinds of necessity, and he holds that the necessity of infallibility is a certainty of the event which comes through the liberty of man. He holds as certain that all evils too are under God's singular providence and that God is not the author of sin. He holds that the contingency of second causes is to be kept in the second act as well as the first, and that the will moved by God fails contingently and freely. He holds that the certainty of salvation rests on the unchangeable decree and not on the will of man. In ethics he allows natural man a liberty left for the good of this life, and says that nature is weak for it.

This chapter reads Walaeus only. It does not set his doctrine beside that of the men he answers, and it names none whom he does not name. It gives no definition of a term that his pages do not give, and it reads what he says in his own words and in their own sense, and no more.

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[102] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 278 (image 862).
[103] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 278 (image 862).
[104] Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae*, 278 (image 862).

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